The Epochal Failure of the EU Commission by Steinbeis, Maximilian
The Epochal Failure of the EU
Commission
Maximilian Steinbeis 2020-10-16T23:52:50
Her name is Beata Morawiec and she is a judge. Not just any judge. She has been
around for a long time, she has influence and experience. She is the president of
one of the two big judges’ associations in Poland. She has, also in this function,
more than once clashed with the Polish government. Most of all with the Minister
of Justice and his policy of discrediting the country’s independent judiciary as a
“caste”, of forcing them under his thumb or replacing them with loyalists. In 2017 she
was sacked as president of the Krakow District Court. The Minister of Justice had a
vicious attack against her posted on his official website. She sued him for defamation
and, what’s worse, she won. The Minister of Justice, however, is at the same time
the head of the public prosecutor’s office. So his prosecutors diligently created a
case against Judge Morawiec and found a telephone salesman named Mirek B. who
was willing to declare that Judge Morawiec had promised him a favorable outcome
of a family lawsuit in return for a telephone he had given to her.
This Monday, Judge Morawiec’s immunity was lifted. She was suspended from office
and her salary was cut by half. This was decided by a judge of the same disciplinary
chamber of the Supreme Court which, according to the European Court of Justice,
cannot even be considered a court at all for its utter lack of judicial independence. If
the decision holds, the Minister of Justice/Prosecutor General can and will now bring
down the full penalizing power of the state on Judge Beata Morawiec.
The day after in Brussels, a spokesperson of the EU Commission was ask at a press
conference how one thinks of this matter in Berlaymont. His answer: Are watching
with concern how. Hope for more clarity when. Strongly emphasize the importance
of. Are in intense dialogue with.
Baka, four and a half years later
This week, on the occasion of our rule of law podcast, I had the pleasure to talk to
ANDRÁS BAKA, the long-time Hungarian judge at the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg and subsequently President of the Hungarian Supreme Court.
Baka is probably the only former ECtHR judge who, as plaintiff, lent his name to
a landmark decision of the Court, too: Baka v. Hungary from 2016, the human
rights verdict of reference for everything going on in Europe regarding judicial
independence. Baka had been removed from office by the Hungarian government
majority in 2011 after he had spoken out against the planned forced retirement of
a significant portion of Hungary’s judiciary. This, according to the ECtHR, violated
Baka’s right to freedom of expression, among other things, and was generally likely
to have a “chilling effect” on the judiciary.
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Four and a half years later, this ruling has still not been implemented by Hungary.
The power of the parliament to kick judges off the bench, along with the according
chilling effect, still exists. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, which
oversees the implementation of the ECtHR rulings, has only just issued another
report to that effect.
Every year there are reports on the implementation status of ECtHR judgments.
Normally, this naming and shaming strategy is rather effective: Countries with shaky
human rights situations usually can be counted on wishing to appear as halfway
respectable members of the European community of states, and in that respect it’s
usually not helpful to get pummeled by the Committee of Ministers year in, year out
with an ever longer list of persistent violations of the law. But this may well change
at a time when other ECHR member states are getting away with literal murder for
years on end without any progress at all, and when it’s become a common part of
political discourse in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland to reject the
binding effect of human rights and obnoxious Strasbourg decisions altogether. What
are you going to do? The ECHR is an international treaty, nothing more. There is no
one who actually exercises power and could use it to enforce compliance with the
law.
++++++++++Anzeige++++++++
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Call for Application: 5 Co-Authors required
The Multinational Development Policy Dialogue of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
in Brussels is looking for five Co-Authors for a study with expertise on one of the
following countries: Mongolia, the Philippines, Tanzania, South Africa and
Venezuela.
The country chapters will be focused on “Political (Opposition) Parties under
Pressure: Strengthening legal frameworks for political parties – Challenges and
Opportunities for external support to political party, parliamentary and election
law development in selected countries”
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The application is open until 30 October 2020 12:00 (midday).
For more information click here.
++++++++++++++++++++++
The EU, however, is different. It has no police force and no executive power of
coercion, to be sure. But it does have the Commission.
The guardian of the treaties, as they call it.
An independent institution. Aloof, detached, bureaucratic, not beholden to people
and sovereign in its comfortable euro bubble, or so the common criticism goes.
Well, yes. Exactly.
The Commission, unlike the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, can
take action and make sure that a member state which fails to comply with its
obligations will get sanctioned. It can take the state to the ECJ if that’s what it takes
to avert damage from the Union. It can make it prohibitively expensive to leave the
infringement unremedied. It doesn’t even have to wait for a verdict in Luxembourg. It
can apply for injunctions.
But it chooses not to. Instead: see above.
Systemic or general deficiencies
Meanwhile, in Luxembourg this week, a hearing has taken place in a case which
deserves all our attention. It’s topic is, once again, the EU arrest warrant or, more
precisely, the question of whether and under what conditions people can still be
handed over to the Polish judiciary if the arrest warrant could just as well be used
for some political shenanigan of one kind or the other. What if the Polish Minister of
Justice suddenly finds that Max Steinbeis is highly suspicious of having stolen silver
spoons and has one of his brand new judges file a request with the Berlin court to
arrest and ship me to Warsaw at the earliest convenience? Is the court in Berlin then
obliged under EU law to do as requested regardless of the merits of the case?
The European Court of Justice clarified this in principle two years ago: The execution
of the EU arrest warrant may be refused if A) there are “general or systemic
deficiencies” in the judicial system of the state in question, and B) the person to be
arrested would be under a specific risk of a violation of his or her fundamental rights.
A is pretty much settled with the Commission’s reasoned opinion on the Article 7
proceedings against Poland. But B is a problem. If the entire judiciary is no longer
independent, how is a poor judge in Enniskillen, Ciudad Real or Unna supposed to
obtain reliable information about the independence of the very judge who issued the
warrant? By asking the Polish Minister of Justice, perhaps?
All this has long been known and discussed over the last two years. In the
meantime, right in the middle of their ongoing dialogue with the Commission,
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the Polish government has decided to doubled down and enact the infamous
“muzzle law“. While the Commission keeps on being concerned, considering stuff,
emphasizing things and admonishing folks instead of finally launching infringement
proceedings against this brutal kick in the teeth of the rule of law in Europe, as it
would be its god-damned job, courts all over Europe have to execute Polish arrest
warrants as if nothing were wrong and are increasingly unwilling to continue doing
so. The Rechtsbank in Amsterdam has referred to the ECJ the question whether,
against this background, Part B of the test can perhaps be dispensed with. This case
was heard in Luxembourg this week, and John Morijn’s report, very much worth
reading, can be found here.
++++++++++Anzeige++++++++
 
Making outstanding research visible – this could be your ADVERTISEMENT
If you want to draw attention to a conference, a job offer, a CfP or a book release,
you can do so on Verfassungsblog. Our weekly editorial is sent out to more than
8.000 constitutionalists world-wide!
Please do not hesitate to contact us (advertise@verfassungsblog.de) for any
requests or queries.
All best,
the Verfassungsblog team
++++++++++++++++++++++
The CJEU is doing what it can. But its possibilities are limited. To refuse to recognize
judicial acts from states that subjugate their judiciary is a consistent, but risky
strategy, especially for EU law itself. In the trajectory of this strategy, ultimately even
referral decisions from Polish courts to the CJEU would appear no longer acceptable
as a matter of course. If the principle of mutual recognition collapses, this would hit
the EU community of law worst, which is probably the reason why the CJEU stuck to
Part B in its test in the first place.
A general lack of trust is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. No-one believes
anything, nothing can be taken at face value, everything actually means something
else and all reality is overgrown by a suffocating mold of lies. The PiS regime is
centered around a lie, and so is the Fidesz regime. You can’t trust anything or
anyone, you have to constantly be afraid of being lied to and cheated on, and it is
this distrust and fear that the regime feeds upon and keeps itself stable even when
all other sources of legitimacy dry up.
The rule of law crisis in Poland and Hungary, in Bulgaria, in Malta, in Romania, at
the EU external borders and God knows where else, has long since infested the
European Union as whole – and thus all of us – and started to rot and disintegrate
the supporting beams of the entire house. The institution responsible for this is not
the Court of Justice, not the Parliament, and possibly not even the Council, whose
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diplomatic approach in this crisis is regrettable but, to some extent, still somewhat
understandable. It is the Commission. Its job is not to be diplomatic but to protect the
treaties against those who break them. That’s what it’s there for. Its failure to do so
may very well be what history will remember the EU Commissions of the 10’s and
their respective presidents Barroso, Juncker and von der Leyen for most.
The week on Verfassungsblog
Not only in Poland and Hungary, but also in Spain judicial independence has
become an issue. JORDI NIEVA-FENOLL addresses the politicization of the
judiciary and the deliberate blocking of the appointment of new members of the
Supreme Judicial Body.
The latest coup of the PiS government in Poland regards the office of human rights
ombudsman. Its holder, Adam Bodnar, had stubbornly and unrelentingly opposed
the government’s attacks against the rule of law throughout his term of office. That,
however, has recently expired. In order to elect a successor, a majority in the Senate
is needed, which is controlled by the opposition. Thus, under current statutory law,
Bodnar remains in office as acting ombudsman for the time being. Now, however,
some PiS MPs plan to use the constitutional court, a reliable tool of all which benefits
PiS, to have that statutory law declared unconstitutional and thus get rid of Adam
Bodnar. MIROS#AW WRÓBLEWSKI, the Director of the Constitutional, International
and European Law Department of the ombudsman office, describes the problem. On
22 October, the Constitutional Court will hand down its judgment.
In Hungary, the government has also come up with a clever new scheme to
make inroads on the independence of the judiciary. It is about the office that the
aforementioned András Baka once held, namely that of president of the Supreme
Court. VIKTOR Z. KAZAI and ÁGNES KOVÁCS describe what is going on and what
the Orbán government is up to.
ANDRÁS BAKA was, as I said, one of my interlocutors in our and the German
Bar Association’s rule of law podcast this week, the topic of which was court
organisation and procedural law: court packing, forced retirement and other
manipulations of the procedural and organisational framework of the independent
judiciary. MARIAROSARIA GUGLIELMI, ANDRÁS BAKA and CHRISTOPH
MÖLLERS discuss, among other things, how “good” judicial reforms can be
distinguished from “bad” ones.
Speaking of court packing: THEODOR SHULMAN notes that Mitch McConnell, the
Republican majority leader in the US Senate, may be a hypocrite but nevertheless
deserves gratitude for the “cathartic effect on judicial nominations” his bad faith may
ultimately have, and extends his sympathy also to SCOTUS nominee Amy Coney
Barrett who, in the event of her confirmation, will have to carry a tremendous burden
of responsibility on her shoulders for restoring the rock-bottom reputation of the
Supreme Court.
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Meanwhile, a draft law of the Federal Ministry of Justice caused a lot of excitement
in Germany this week for using exclusively the generic feminine form. The
Federal Ministry of the Interior, greatly attached to all things masculine in linguistics
and otherwise, had the presumption to find that language discriminatory and
unconstitutional, much to the mocking delight of ANNA KATHARINA MANGOLD.
++++++++++Anzeige++++++++
- 7 -
- 8 -
3rd Rudolf Bernhardt Lecture – Professor Ba#ak Çal#:
”‘To me, fair friend, you can never be old’: The European Convention on
Human Rights at 70”
Ba#ak Çal# is professor of International Law and Co-Director at the Centre for
Fundamental Rights, Hertie School, Berlin.
Friday, 23 October 2020, 17:00 h (via Zoom/Livestream)
For details and registration see here.
Funded by alumni, friends and former students of Rudolf Bernhardt on the occasion
of his 90th birthday in 2015, the Rudolf Bernhardt Lecture honors the life and work of
the institute’s director emeritus.
++++++++++++++++++++++
Covid-19 is on the rise in Germany as everywhere else, and many of the German
state governments, being in charge of fighting the pandemic and not knowing
what else they could do, resorted to a ban on accommodating tourists. That didn’t
stand in court, for the most part. ALEXANDER THIELE examines how the Bavarian
regulation relates to the equality principle in the German constitution.
In Spain, too, government measures against the spread of COVID-19 have met
resistance in court. In Madrid, a court refused to affirm the local perimeter lockdown.
PATRICIA GARCÍA MAJADO explains that the judgement does not refer to the
proportionality of the order, but was rather based on the lack of authorization.
Alarming things are happening with regard to Covid-19 and fundamental rights
in Israel. A few days ago, the Knesset expanded the authorization to impose a
state of emergency, which can now severely restrict freedom of assembly. TAMAR
HOSTOVSKY BRANDES compares the legal situation with Russian dolls and places
her hopes in the Israeli Supreme Court to protect fundamental rights, especially with
a view to possible early elections.
Can state investigators demand from Google the data of persons who have typed
certain keywords into its search engine? Turns out this has already happened in
the US. ALBERT FOX CAHN and AMANDA HUMELL analyze the legal situation
and consider “keyword search warrants” a tangible threat to civil society and basic
rights.
The German Bundestag’s research service has issued an expert opinion on the
legality of US sanctions regarding the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project.
According to CHRISTIAN TIETJE and MARCEL VALENTIN, the argumentation is
unconvincing in terms of both general international law and international treaty law.
This week, the German Bundestag amended the law on members of parliament,
presumably to comply with the BVerfG’s demand to do something about the use
of Bundestag staffers for the parties’ election campaigns. This did not work,
MATTHIAS FRIEHE states.
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Alright, then, I guess I’m done for this week. This has been one long editorial. In
case I haven’t tested your patience too much already: please pay whichever sum
you find adequate via Paypal (paypal@verfassungsblog.de) or bank transfer (IBAN
DE41 1001 0010 0923 7441 03, BIC PBNKDEFF). The best thing you could do to
keep us afloat would be some sort of regular support, though, such as becoming a
member on the great platform Steady. It’s very easy and uncomplicated, actually.
Anyway, stay safe and well and all the best,
Max Steinbeis
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